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The Capstone Project will focus on money laundering in Nigeria by Politically Exposed 
Persons (PEPs) and the devastating negative impact on Nigeria’s progress as well as 
various measures that could combat it.   
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines money laundering as the processing of 
“ Criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.” And PEPs as “someone who has 
been entrusted with a public function.”  (FATF, 2018). The Nigerian government has 
adopted the term, “politically exposed persons” to include senior politicians and senior 
government officials as well as their immediate family. 
 
According to Nigeria’s president, Muhammadu Buhari, $150 billion was stolen from the 
government in only 10 years  (between 2005 and 2015). (Buhari, 2015). President Buhari 
stated that until 2015, PEPs were conducting official government business with personal 
and private corporate accounts.  $150 billion is about one third of the Nigerian economy. 
According to the World Bank, Nigeria’s Gross Domestics product (GDP) in 2016 was 
$404, 653 billion. (World Bank, 2016).  
 
Money laundering by PEPs on the Nigerian State has resulted in 70% of its citizens living 
in poverty and misery, despite the fact that Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy that is 
rich in natural resources and is the sixth largest exporter of crude oil earning over $300 
billion dollars in the last thirty years of the 20th century. (World Bank, 2010, 2016).   
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This project will examine various methods, through which PEPs launder money as well 
as explore the consequences money laundering has exacted on the State. Additionally, 
this paper will highlight anti-money laundering (AML) efforts by both the government 
and the international community and their impact in combating money laundering.  
Finally, I will explore various recommendations that can assist in combating money 
laundering in Nigeria.  And how countries and international organizations that provide 
financial support and aid to Nigeria can use that leverage in assisting to combat money 
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Chapter 1 – Money laundering Concepts 
 
1.1 Origin of the process of money laundering  
 
For a holistic understanding of the concept of money laundering today, it is important to 
acknowledge its origins. The process of money laundering has been around for over 2000 
years. In China, businessmen concealed their wealth from their leaders because most 
forms of commercial activity were banned at the time. And the authorities regarded the 
businessmen of the day as dishonest and shady. Instead of running the risk of loosing 
their ill-gotten wealth, the businessmen relocated and invested in remote areas and 
outside China as a way of concealing their earnings. (Nigel Morris- Cotterill, n.d.). 
 
During the 13th Century B.C., pirates seized, valuables along the international trade 
routes in the high seas from traders and thereafter concealed and disguised their origin in 
order to profit from their crimes. (Anti-Money Laundering Forum, n.d.). 
 
While the process of money laundering has been around for some time, there appears to 
be no consensus regarding the origin of the phrase “money laundering”. One source has it 
that the phrase “money laundering” originated during the days of Al Capone and the 
Italian Mafia. This period was called the prohibition era because the sale of alcohol was 
banned constitutionally. At the time, Al Capone and his fellow criminals commingled 
illegal proceeds from prostitution and bootlegged liquor sales with legitimately purchased 
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laundromats to conceal their illegal profit (International Information Money Laundering 
Bureau, n.d.).  
Another source states that the term “money laundering” was used in 1961 and 
subsequently appeared in print during the Watergate scandal after which the term began 
to be used prominently. (Munro, Duke, n.d.). 
 
Nonetheless, there have been criminal activities going back thousands of years and 
criminals always attempted to profit from their crime by concealing and disguising the 
source of their gains through money laundering. 
 
1.2 Evolution of the definition of money laundering  
“The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988 Vienna Convention)” described money laundering with 
drug trafficking as its predicate offense. This description was accepted and widespread at 
the time. The consequence of this description was that illegal proceeds derived from non-
drug trafficking crimes such as terrorism or bribery was not considered money 
laundering.  
 
At the time of the Vienna Convention, the focus was to combat drug trafficking. 
However, with the increase in other crimes such as kidnapping, theft of government 
funds, embezzlement, fraud and terrorism with its negative implications on countries, an 
international consensus emerged for a broader strategy to combat these crimes. This 
consensus was that in order to fight these other crimes, the proceeds that derived from 
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their activities had to be criminalized as crimes as well. The result was the beginning of 
the redefinition of money laundering to include other crimes as predicates to money 
laundering. Subsequently,  “The United Nations 2000 Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime”, the Palermo Convention, re-defined "money laundering to include 
other crimes and any illegal activities as predicates to money laundering.” The Palermo 
convention also encouraged other signatories at the convention to adopt this strategy and 
definition.  
 
Influenced by the “Palermo Convention” The Money laundering Act 1995 (Nigeria) was 
amended – by Money Laundering Act (Amendment) Bill 2002 to include laundering of 
proceeds of any crime or illegal acts as predicates to money laundering.  
 
The accepted definition of money laundering today evolved to include the demands of 
various stakeholders to address the wider issues presented by increased cross border 
criminal activities. 
1.3 Analyzing the definition of money laundering  
 
 Based on its origin, money laundering is knowingly using money from an illegal activity 
or crime with intentions of concealing its source. 
 
The primary objective of the definitions of money laundering was the detection of 
criminals and to ensure they do not profit from their criminal enterprise.  
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“The United Nations 2000 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime”, also 
known as the “Palermo Convention,” defines “money laundering” as follows: 
“The conversion or transfer of property, knowing it is derived from a criminal offense, 
for the purpose of concealing or disguising its illicit origin or of assisting any person who 
is involved in the commission of the crime to evade the legal consequences of his 
actions.” 
 
“The concealment or disguising of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property knowing that it is derived 
from a criminal offense.” 
 
“The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of its receipt that it 
was derived from a criminal offense or from participation in a crime.” (UNCATOC, 
2000). 
 
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), defines “money 
laundering” as “the processing of…criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin” in 
order to “legitimize” the ill-gotten gains of crime.” (FATF, 2018) 
 
The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act (Nigeria), 2004 is expansive in its definition of 
money laundering. The act defines money laundering as when a person converts or 
transfers resources or properties derived directly or indirectly from illicit drug trafficking 
or any other crimes or illegal act, with the aim of concealing or disguising its illicit 
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origin. It further defines money laundering to include aiding or collaborating with any 
person involved in illicit drug trafficking or any other crime or illegal act to evade or 
conceal the original illegal act. Finally, a person will be guilty of money laundering for  
collaborating in concealing or disguising the genuine nature, origin, location, disposition, 
movement or ownership of the resources property or right thereto derived directly or 
indirectly from illicit drug trafficking or psychotropic substances or any other crime or 











Chapter 2 Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) 
 
2.1 Who is a “Politically Exposed Person”? 
 
“The term PEPs, refers to past or present high-ranking senior foreign political figures or 
senior level persons in the executive, legislative, administrative, military, and judicial 
branches of a government who are currently or formerly entrusted with high-level public 
duties and responsibilities.” (Beare, 2012). Beare’s definition captures most institutional 
definitions of PEP, which is based on the 2003 Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF) standard. 
 
“FATF was established by the G-7 Summit in Paris in 1989 to develop a coordinated 
international response to money laundering. (FATF, 2012).” (Schneider, Beare, Hill, 
n.d.). The following countries make up the G-7 summit: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom and the United States.   
 
Influenced by the consistent international definitions, the Nigerian government’s 
Securities and Exchange Commission Nigeria, Anti-Money Laundering Combating 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Compliance Manual For Capital Market Operators 
2010 defines Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) “as individuals who are or have been 
entrusted with prominent public functions both in foreign countries as well as in Nigeria. 
(Securities and Exchange Commission Nigeria, 2010).  “Examples of Nigerian PEPs 
would include, the President, former President, current/former Governors, current /former 
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ministers, current/former permanent secretaries, CEO’s of government agencies and 
representatives of the National Assembly among others.   
 
The Nigerian government’s definition of PEP also derives from the need to meet 
international best practices and the amended FATF 40 Recommendations. FATF 40 
recommendations established steps to be taken by States to implement an effective anti-
money laundering regime. 
2.2 Origin of the term “Politically Exposed Persons” 
 
The designation "politically exposed person" dates back to the late 1990s, in what was 
known as the "Abacha Affair." Sani Abacha, a Nigerian dictator was President of Nigeria 
from 1993 to 1998.  
 
Abacha, along with his family and associates stole billions of dollars from the Nigerian 
central bank. The stolen billion dollars were transferred to bank accounts in the United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the US. In 2001, in an attempt to 
recover the stolen money, the successor Nigerian Government to the Abacha regime 
lodged complaints with several European agencies, including the Federal Office of Police 
of Switzerland. During these investigations, the concept of politically exposed persons 
emerged. The PEP concept was subsequently incorporated into the October 2003 
resolution of United Nations Convention against Corruption. (WikiVisually, n.d.). 
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A PEP is therefore perceived to be a corrupt and powerful state official or someone 
connected to a state official in any way who is expected to be subjected to a higher level 
of due diligence by banks and financial institutions.  
2.3 How PEPs Launder Money  
 
Money laundering involves secretive dealings and structured transactions to disguise their 
origins and destination. (Sikka, 2008). Public information and investigations show that 
money laundering is facilitated mostly through banking institutions, offshore financial 
centers (OFCs), wires systems, shell corporations, family businesses, professionals, and 
financial intermediaries. Of particular note is the consistent role OFCs play in aiding and 
abetting money-laundering activities. (US Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005, 
2010). The OFCs are characterized as jurisdictions that attract a high level of non-
resident financial activity with high-level secrecy, low or no tax with little or no 
regulation.  
 
It is no longer surprising that Nigerian PEPs penetrate financial institutions in various 
jurisdictions. And due to their enormous powers garnered through corruption, PEPs have 
succeeded in making vulnerable the AML laws of those jurisdictions. Evidence informs 
that nearly all the money looted from Nigeria by PEPs ended up in secret banks located in 
OFCs in developed countries. (Oxfam, 2000; Sikka, 2003; US Senate Subcommittee on 
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The following case studies offer an insight into how Nigerian PEPs launder money. 
 
A. Abubakar Atiku (Vice President, Nigeria, 1999-2007) 
 
Abubakar Atiku used his wife, Jennifer Douglas Abubakar to launder over $40 million of 
suspect funds including proceeds of bribery into the US from 2000 to 2008. (US Senate 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2010). 
Prior to becoming Vice President of Nigeria, Atiku worked as a civil servant in the 
Nigeria Customs for 25 years. Atiku married Ms Jennifer Douglas in 2003 as his fourth 
wife after she divorced and became a naturalized US citizen. (US Senate Subcommittee 
on Investigations, 2010). Atiku laundered money by using his wife, Jennifer, offshore 
shell companies and banks in the US. Atiku and his wife, Ms Jennifer Douglas set up 
numerous bank accounts in Citibank, Chevy Chase, Wachovia, Eagle bank and SunTrust. 
These accounts were opened in disguised names such as trusts, foundations, variants of 
the wife’s names and initials to avoid detection. (US Senate Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2010). 
 
Atiku’s laundering activities were perpetrated through wire transfers from offshore 
companies in the British Virgin Islands, Germany, Nigeria, Panama and Switzerland into 
the US. In fact, Ms Douglas’s legal counsel and an executive of three of the offshore 
companies wired a combined $38 million dollars to various accounts controlled by Atiku 
and his wife. (US Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, 2010).  




Additionally, Ms Douglas used one of the accounts to accept bribe payments of $2.2 
million to Atiku from Siemens AG to secure a Nigerian contract. Siemens AG’s own 
internal investigation confirmed that it wired over $2 million dollars over a three-year 
period to two accounts controlled by Ms Douglas on behalf of Atiku. These bribery 
payments are already under investigation.  
Ms. Douglas subsequently admitted that money wired to her accounts were from her 
husband and that those monies came from her husband’s oil company, Oil Logistics and 
not from any other source. She denied knowledge of the offshore companies that wired 
money to her accounts. (US Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, 2010).  
 
B. Late Nigerian President Sani Abacha 
Sani Abacha ruled Nigeria from November 1993 till he died in June 1998. After 
his death, a government investigation panel discovered that Abacha and his family 
stole between $2.5 and 4 billion from the government. Abacha stole directly from 
Nigeria’s central bank by simply requesting funds for security needs.  Abacha’s 
proxies would collect money from the Nigerian central bank and deposit the fund 
into various personal and business accounts from where it would be fraudulently 
moved into foreign jurisdictions and lodged under various fictitious names, trusts 
and shell companies. (FATF, 2012). 
 
Abacha and his family also received kickbacks from over inflated contracts he 
awarded to cronies.  In one case, Abacha made the government of Nigeria pay 
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$110 million for vaccines worth less than $23 million. In another case, army 
vehicles were procured for $184 million (inflated by almost $140 million dollars). 
About $100 million was kicked back to Abacha and wired to disguised bank 
accounts in Switzerland, while the contractor’s share of approximately USD 40 
million was paid into accounts in Jersey. (FATF, 2012). 
 
Nigeria’s former dictator, Sani Abacha was able to meander his way through 
various international jurisdictions including the Nigerian, UK, US, Hong Kong, 
Luxembourg and Swiss banking system albeit unimpeded and extensively to 
launder large sums of money. (Keesoony, 2016).  
C. James Ibori, Former Governor 
 
James Ibori was Governor of Nigeria’s Delta State from 1999 to 2007. He stole 
funds through inflated government contracts, kickbacks and direct withdrawals 
from state accounts. Ibori laundered millions of stolen funds in Nigeria, UK, 
British Virgin Island and the US through shell companies and multiple fictitious 
accounts. Ibori’s wife, girlfriend, personal assistant and London based solicitor all 
played various roles in aiding the laundering scheme. Ibori’s wife transferred 
stolen funds out of Nigeria, invested them in properties in the UK among other 
locations on behalf of Ibori. (FATF, 2012). 
 
Ibori utilized the services of Bhadresh Gohil, a corrupt London-based solicitor, to 
launder funds.  This solicitor moved Ibori’s stolen money into clients account in 
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the UK to the Switzerland and back to the UK in a bid to wash the money. 
(FATF, 2012). 
 
Ibori’s corrupted intermediaries facilitated his scheme doing whatever needed to 
be done. Ibori’s assistant was used to transfer funds from Nigeria as well as to 
control many of these fictitious accounts. In 2012, Ibori pleaded guilty to ten 
counts of fraud and laundering over $250 million of state money. He was 
sentenced to 13 years in prison. (FATF, 2012).  
 
Ibori’s money laundering schemes were aided by family members, assistants, 
lawyers, and banking officials. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
(HSBC) failed to identify Ibori as a politically exposed person (PEP) and allowed 
the concealment of the illicit funds within their branches, despite the Know Your 
Client requirement under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 (Brooks, 
2012).  
2.4 Conclusion  
 
The foregoing shows how Nigerian PEPs launder money using banking facilities, OFCs, 
wires systems, shell corporations, family business and financial intermediaries. OFC’s 
provide secrecy, lax regulation and freedom from financial disclosure requirement 
(Otusanya, Lauwo, 2012), which is evidently exploited by Nigerian PEPs. 
 
Atiku’s money laundering scheme involved facilitators and intermediaries that included, 
international OFC companies, various professional firms, and US banks. Atiku and his 
Money Laundering by Nigerian PEP Ikemefune Onyiliogwu 
 
 18 
wife, Ms. Jennifer Douglas were central players in laundering millions in suspect funds 
into the USA through various accounts in different banks. “The flow of funds in and out 
of these accounts exposed the opaque structures designed by Mr. Abubakar and Ms. 
Douglas to disguise the ownership and the illegal source of the funds.” (Olatunde, 
Lauwo, 2012), (Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, 2010). 
 
The above case studies are not isolated incidences. These few cases only highlights the 
means by which a large spectrum of PEPs launder billions of dollars outside Nigeria. 
Nigeria continues to be a country where corruption is a way and means of getting things 
done at all levels of government.  (Asekhauno, Timinimi, 2017). Humungous sums of 
money are laundered in local banks unchecked on a daily basis.   
 
Nonetheless, the role and active involvement of banking facilities, OFCs, wires systems, 
shell corporations, family business and financial intermediaries in aiding Nigerian PEPs 







Chapter 3 Banks as Facilitators  
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3.1 The Role of the Nigerian Banks as Gatekeepers in aiding PEPs in 
Money Laundering 
 
The most difficult facilitators of money laundering to detect are arguably financial 
institutions. (Keesoony, 2016). Perhaps, the fight against money laundering cannot be 
successful without the banking industry’s compliance with AML due diligence, know 
your customer and filing of suspicious activity reports (SAR) requirements.  
 
Instead, Nigerian banks unfortunately serve as conduits and repositories of laundered 
money. The above has been giving credence by the former pioneer Chairman of the 
Nigerian AML agency, Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), Mr. Nuhu 
Ribadu. Ribadu said, “several money laundering frauds happen in Nigeria with the active 
connivance of banks and their workers” … that the Nigerian banking system is prone to 
abuse by corrupt elements. As investigations reveal every now and then, almost no case 
of corruption occurs without the involvement of banks and bankers.” (Odunsi, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, an EFCC investigation of some Governors in 2007 indicted a number of 
banks for facilitating money laundering by PEPs in Nigeria. In one instance some 
Nigerian banks (International Bank, International Trust Bank, Allstates Trust Bank and 
Lion Bank Plc.) used cronies and nominee companies to facilitate money laundering. 
(Certified Court Charge No. FHC/ABJ/CR/85/2007, 2007).  
 
In another case, a former Governor, Kalu was alleged to have operated 51 accounts in 
five Nigerian banks to launder different sums of money.  In all, 106 transfers were 
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allegedly made from three State accounts by Kalu and his mother in favor of a company 
owned by Kalu - Slok Nigeria Limited. Local banks aided by professional bankers 
facilitated these transactions.  (Certified Court Charge No. FHC/ABJ/CR/56/2007, 2007). 
 
The Nigerian company Guaranty Trust Bank (UK) Limited was fined five hundred and 
twenty five thousand pounds (£525,000) by British authorities for numerous failures in 
their AML controls, including failure to carry out background checks to establish whether 
certain customers were PEPs (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013). Rather, the bank 
created an avenue for customers to circumvent risk assessments (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 2013). The bank advised customers that they could use “day to day expenses” 
as a legitimate reason for having an account knowing that this reason was inconsistent 
with the profile of the customers. (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013). 
 
Evidently, the banks are used in all three stages of money laundering: placement, layering 
and integration (UNODC, 2014). Placement is where the illegal profits (usually cash) are 
deposited into the bank. (UNODC, 2014). Placement is actually the first stage whereby 
the illicit funds are distanced from both the crime and the criminals (UNODC, 2014). In 
layering, the launderer directly or indirectly (through proxies) converts or moves the 
illegal proceeds through various types of purchases or wires the funds via accounts at 
different banks across jurisdictions. In instances, the launderer may disguise the 
transactions as payments for goods or services, to present an aura of legitimacy. 
Launderers use layering to obscure the criminal trail in an attempt to further disassociate 
the funds from its source. (Keesoony, 2016). Complex, artificial schemes are used to 
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achieve disassociation, which can involve the physical dispersing or smurfing of the 
funds into various financial institutions globally. (Rachagan and Kasipillai, 2013). 
Integration is the final stage where the funds re-enters the legitimate economy. The 
launderer might choose to invest the funds into anything ranging from real estate, luxury 
assets or any business venture. 
 
Nigerian banks and financial institutions involvement in money laundering has to be seen 
in the context of Nigeria’s description as one of the most corrupt countries in the world 
where pervasive corruption constitutes a major threat to most of the reported money 
laundering cases. (The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in 
West Africa (GIABA), 2008).  
 
Bank executives who are supposed to be guardians of financial integrity and soldiers in 
the fight against money laundering have been charged with same crime themselves. 
(Otusanya, 2012), reports: 
“In 2009, the EFCC arraigned former Managing Director of Finbank Plc., and three other 
directors of the bank before a Nigerian Court over alleged role in a $276 million money 
laundering.” (The Sun, 2009). The EFCC investigations showed that the former bank 
chiefs laundered about $88 million and failed to take all reasonable steps to give a true 
and fair view of the state of affairs of the bank by incorrectly reporting a total of $130 
million borrowed in its statement of assets and liability. (The Sun, 2009).  
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The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa 
(GIABA) stated 10 years ago that Nigeria’s corruption is a threat to money laundering 
cases. (GIABA, 2008). In 2018, most people believe that observation still remains true 
today. Nigerian banks have made no significant progress in complying with regulatory 
requirements that will reduce incidences of money laundering. It is rare to come across an 
investigation that was instigated by the reporting of a SAR. Most money laundering 
investigations have been initiated through mostly petitions by citizens and recently - by 
whistle blowing. 
 
The foregoing brings into focus the money laundering and corruption activities of 
Nigeria’s former first lady, Ms. Patience Jonathan. Ms. Patience Jonathan is alleged to 
have opened various fictitious accounts in Nigerian banks depositing a total of $46 
million. Nigeria’s EFCC’s interim report indicated that the $46 million dollars, 
comprised of funds from some government agencies. (Bankole, 2017). 
 
EFCC further uncovered and froze an additional 15 bank accounts with a total of $8.4 
million controlled by Ms. Jonathan. Ms. Jonathan sued the EFCC asking the courts to 
unfreeze those accounts. In other words acknowledging ownership and/ or interest in 
those accounts. Had the various banks complied with the due diligence and know your 
customer (KYC) requirement those accounts would not have been opened in the first 
place. And even if the accounts were opened, SARS would have been filed and reported 
once suspicious payments began to be deposited into those accounts. 
Money Laundering by Nigerian PEP Ikemefune Onyiliogwu 
 
 23 
The fact is that one of the important reasons banks fail to comply with AML laws and 
regulations is because banks are beneficiaries of laundered money. And these laundered 
monies are in some instances used in running the banks and making them appear to be 
profitable institutions. 
 
3.2 Quantification of money laundered by PEPs  
 
It may not be possible to quantify the total amount of money laundered by PEPs. Partly 
because of the absence of any methodology that will produce credible numbers (Reuter, 
2013) and  “due to the illegal nature of the transactions, precise statistics are not available 
and it is therefore impossible to produce a definitive estimate of the amount of money 
that is globally laundered every year.” (FATF, 2018). 
Money laundering as a crime, in of itself - is a consequence of underlying crimes such as 
inflated government contracts, kickbacks, outright theft of government funds and 
embezzlement. These types of underlying money - laundering crimes are hidden and 
usually impossible to be accurately tabulated. 
 
In Nigeria, corruption is widespread at all levels of government and huge sums of money 
have been stolen by PEPs. And it is clear that billions of dollars are laundered out of 
Nigeria. In fact in the mid 80’s it was estimated that the billions laundered out of Nigeria 
led to the collapse of many banks at the time (Aluko, Bagheri, 2012). 
 
While quantifying the amount of money laundered may be difficult, knowing how 
pervasive money laundering is - serves an important policy objective. Because money 
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laundering involves other crimes that impacts society as a whole, the same as other 
crimes like drug trafficking and terrorism.    
Therefore any responsible government will seek to develop consequential measures to 
address money laundering, its underlying crimes and the associated criminals.    
3.3 Consequences of Money Laundering in Nigeria 
 
Money laundering has undermined the total development of Nigeria as a nation 
financially, economically, politically and socially.  
 
The impact of money laundering on Nigeria is especially worse considering the fact that 
the nation is still a developing country with an already cultivated reputation as the major 
center of money laundering ventures in Africa. (Aluko, Bagheri, 2012). As a developing 
country, Nigerians lack basic amenities of existence. (NBS, 2015). “70 percent of its 
citizens live below the poverty line of $1.25, life expectancy is less than 52 years, over 10 
million children are out of school, infant/child mortality and maternal mortality is one of 
the highest in the world after China and India.” (NBS, 2015). 
 
From the grim statistics, it is evident that money laundering has had severe consequences 
on Nigeria’s development because the “laundered money” is the money that would have 
been used to provide basic amenities.  
A. Financial Impact 
 
Money laundering activities have undermined the integrity of the Nigerian 
financial system consistently. Most of the Nigerian banks relied on the ill -gotten 
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money being transferred out of the country by PEPs  - for their operation. And 
when the money was no longer available, most of the banks collapsed further 
damaging an already compromised financial system. The damaged status of the 
nation's financial system stalled foreign investments. (LaFraniere, 2005). Perhaps, 
the worst threat to the financial system is the widespread belief that PEPs are 
continuously seeking to control financial institutions after all; some PEPs own 
controlling interest in the banks. 
B. Economic Impact 
 
Money launderers employ front businesses that drive many legitimate companies 
in the private sector out of business. These front businesses stifle legitimate 
competitors by subsidizing prices with their illicit funds and offering their 
products and services at below market prices. Some of these legitimate 
competitor’s collapse because they are usually financed by financial institutions 
and are unable to compete. “Money launderers often use front companies, to 
commingle the proceeds of their illicit activities with legitimate funds, to hide 
their illicit proceeds.” (McDowell and Novis, 2001).   
 
Proceeds from money laundering are ill gotten and are not declared as income to 
avoid detection. As a consequence taxes are not paid and the government looses 
that income.  Money laundering and its predicate offences contribute to the tax 
gap and decreases government tax collections.  
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Money launderers seek to conceal the source of their ill-gotten funds, so they 
move their proceeds from one venture to another without any financial reason. 
This movement of money in and out of the financial system by money launderers 
created the fiscal instability in the 80’s and late 90’s that distorted the Nigerian 
economy. (CBN, 2000). Additionally, money launderers are not profit motivated. 
Their investment decisions are self-serving and geared to recycle their illicit 
proceeds. As such, their economic and commercial ventures are usually not 
intended to benefit the economy. (McDowell and Norris, 2001).   
 
C. Political Impact 
Money laundering could potentially corrupt the governance and the political 
process. It is not unusual for money launderers to deploy their ill - gotten wealth 
to gain political influence so as to maintain control and protect the source of their 
corruption. Money launderers use their enormous stolen wealth to corrupt the 
process. And deprived people are prone to being corrupted. PEPs have 
perpetuated the concept of God “fatherism.” This is a concept where PEPs 
financially sponsor people for powerful political offices and influential positions 
in government. Through this process PEPs maintain control of government 
because the people they sponsored owe their promotional positions to the PEPs 
and usually do their corrupt bidding. Arguably, PEPs have put people in positions 
of influence in the Judiciary, Executive and Legislative branches of government.  
(Osakede, Ijimakinwa 2016). 
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D. Social Impact 
 
Money laundering diverts resources away from sectors of critical importance 
including health, education and development denying citizens the benefits of 
economic growth and development opportunities. (UNCRI, n.d.). Crime, social 
instability, vices and violence become prominent due to the increasing inequality, 
poverty and mass mistrust of PEPs, resulting in civil and political unrest. (Aluko, 
Bagheri, 2012).  This corrupt culture of money laundering has recycled into 
pervasive impunity and turned Nigeria into a country beset with all sorts of crime 
ranging from advanced fee fraud, kidnappings, armed robbery, various internet 
get rich scams and bank robbery. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Based on the above facts, money laundering has undermined the total development of 
Nigeria as a nation financially, economically, politically and socially. 
 
Nigerian citizens have suffered due to capital flight as a result of the laundering of 
resources meant for developmental projects. Perhaps it will not be an overstatement to 
characterize Nigeria as a nation where there is entrenched resentment, widespread 
unemployment, low level of public service and a general lack of opportunity for its 
people.  
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Chapter 4  Responses to the Menace of Money Laundering 
4.1 Mechanisms to check Money Laundering in Nigeria 
 
Having identified money laundering as one of the most pervasive forms of crime in 
Nigeria, the government has enacted various regulatory mechanisms and established 
institutions as part of its overall reform measures. These measures include the enactment 
of the following laws. 
The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act, 1989. This was considered 
significant because it brought Nigeria in compliance with the Vienna Convention (Hull, 
Evans, Davis, 2011). 
The Money Laundering Decree 1995. The aim of the money laundering decree was to 
prevent and uncover money launderers through requiring banks to have a documentary 
trail in all transactions and creating a closer link between the banks and NDLEA. 
(1) The Money Laundering Act (Amendment) 2002. The aim of the Act was to 
include any crime or illegal activity as predicates to money laundering 
thereby expanding the scope of the 1995 Money Laundering Decree. 
(2) The EFCC (Establishment) Act 2002. The EFCC was established with 
investigative powers of non-drug trafficking money laundering cases and 
enforcement of the 1995 money laundering legislation as amended in 2002. 
(3) The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. This Act improved upon the 
previous versions. The Act established the Nigerian Financial Intelligence 
Unit (NFIU) within the EFCC, which became operational in January 2005. 
Also, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 provides for appropriate 
penalties for money laundering infractions. 
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(4) The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011. This Act repealed the 2004 
Act with provisions prohibiting the laundering of proceeds of illegal activities 
or crime as well as financing terrorism. The Act also expanded the scope of 
supervisory and regulatory authorities and made provisions for appropriate 
penalties for offenders. 
 
Additionally, institutions were established and existing institutions were given more 
powers to combat money laundering: 
 
The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) was established in 2000 to 
investigate reports of corrupt practices, eradicate corruption in government institutions, 
and educate the public against corruption and study practices and procedures as a mean of 
preventing corruption.  
 
The EFCC investigates and prosecutes economic and financial crimes, while the ICPC 
investigates and prosecutes all forms of corruption and educates the public against 
corruption. 
 
The EFCC was established in 2003 with powers to investigate money-laundering 
activities except those related to drug activities. 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was given more powers to intervene in the banking 
sector to safeguard confidence in the financial system and deal with money laundering. 
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Consequently, the CBN has responsibilities to surveil the financial sector with a view to 
identifying trends and patterns of corruption in banks and other monetary institutions. 
The CBN is also charged with increasing efficiency in regulatory oversight through the 
Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC) through coordinated 
efforts among financial institutions. 
A. Other Government Mechanisms  
 
The government has regulatory powers to freeze suspected assets or proceeds of 
money - laundering through the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA), the Foreign Exchange Decree and the Money Laundering Act which 
all authorize the freezing of assets. The government could freeze assets 
administratively or judicially through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) or as the 
result of a judgment by a court or tribunal. The Nigerian government can also 
freeze assets upon a foreign government’s request where there is an existing 
mutual legal treaty between both countries.  
 
From 1991 to 2003 government had attempted to deal with money – laundering 
by enacting the following laws with various AML imperatives: “Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions Act 1991 (BOFIA) amended in 2002”, “Advanced Fee 
Fraud and Other Related Offences Decree 1993”,” Failed Banks (Recovery of 
Debt and Financial Malpractice in Banks) Act 1994”, Advance Fee Fraud and 
Other Related Offences Decree (creating "419" offences) 1995, “Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act (establishing the ICPC) 2000”,” 
Electoral Act (replaced 2001 Electoral Act) 2002.” 




Undoubtedly, Nigeria has made significant strides in laying the foundation and 
structure to combat money laundering by establishing necessary laws and 
complying with international AML mandates and imperatives. And without these 
significant strides the progress so far might have been impossible. 
 
The regulatory and institutional mechanisms in place have yielded some successes. 
The constant arrest, interrogation and freezing of assets as well as the successful 
prosecution of some PEPs has arguably served to deter to some conscionable PEPs. 
Additionally, the EFCC is courting international assistance aggressively in locating 
laundered funds and continues to recover billions on a regular basis for the government. 
(Uwujaren, 2017). 
4.2 Issues impacting Anti-Money Laundering efforts in Nigeria 
 
Whatever progress the country has made in tackling money laundering, could be 
considered infinitesimal at best when compared to the damage money laundering has 
continued to inflict on Nigeria and its development. Lots of issues have continued to 
impede the efforts in combating money laundering. Unfortunately, in most of the issues 
corruption happens to be a huge factor.  
A. Conflicting Messages 
Chief among the issues impacting anti money laundering efforts is the conflicting 
message from the government and the perception of lack of a transparent sincere 
commitment to combat money laundering. As is often said, actions speak louder 
than words. And pictures are worth a thousand words. 
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The current Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari was elected in 2015 based 
on his anti - corruption reputation. Buhari defeated the previous President, 
Jonathan because the administration was widely regarded as the most corrupt and 
incompetent government in Nigeria’s history. 
 
Buhari had a reputation as an anti - corruption crusader and reformer. He must 
therefore avoid any action that contradicts that reputation and perception. 
 
One of the prominent PEPs charged with multiple counts of money laundering, 
former Governor Kalu whose case has gone on for more than 8 years was 
received in audience by President Buhari and thereafter treated to a private dinner 
with the picture of the President and Kalu plastered all over the newspapers.  
 
The suspected criminal, Kalu is now the self-styled acting Chairman of an 
organization to reelect the President called the “ National Intervention 
Movement.” Kalu now travels all over the country visiting prominent political and 
traditional leaders in a campaign to reelect the President. The President appears to 
have endorsed that movement because he has not disavowed Kalu and his 
organization. 
 
President Buhari has not been personally accused of corruption. And Kalu is still 
considered innocent until proven guilty. But, the President’s actions perceptibly 
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conflicts and undermines any transparent commitment to combat money 
laundering. 
 
The Nigerian government has failed to charge its former Vice President, Atiku 
along with his wife for money laundering after overwhelming record evidence in 
a US high profile senate committee hearing. (US Senate Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2010).  
 
Prosecuting Atiku, a high profile PEP for money laundering would have set the 
right tone and sent the right message that the government is committed to 
combating money laundering.  
 
Atiku’s case is bewildering. In fact, Siemens, a company that made bribe 
payments to Atiku through his wife’s admitted on the record to doing so. Atiku 
violated various money-laundering laws in Nigeria and the US.  
 
Atiku’s former boss, former Nigerian President, Obasanjo declared Atiku one of 
the most corrupt public servants. (Alli, 2013). Furthermore, Obasanjo admitted 
that he knew Atiku was corrupt before he selected him (Atiku) to contest for 
reelection.  (Newsrescue, 2017). Prior to these developments, Obasanjo had 
already established the EFCC as President to fight corruption. So why did 
Obasanjo, a seating President at the time select a man he knew to be corrupt to 
run for re-election as his running mate? Obasanjo explains, “At that time, 
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politically, I needed to carry him (Atiku) along but then to put him in check,” 
(Newsrescue, 2017). Obasanjo was subsequently reelected along with Atiku who 
had immunity from prosecution the next four years. Obasanjo, the Nigerian 
president at the time failing to send a clear message about his commitment to 
fighting money laundering. 
 
Atiku remains a free man and has recently declared his intention to contest the 
Presidency in 2019. 
 
Ms. Jonathan, Nigeria’s former first lady is another case among many that sends 
conflicting messages. She controls several fictitious accounts with fraudulently 
obtained millions of dollars.  Instead of being charged with money laundering, the 
government is involved in back and forth court cases about freezing or unfreezing 
those accounts.    
 
Contrast this with the situation in Brazil. The former Brazilian President, Luiz 
Lula Silva was charged and convicted for money laundering and has begun a 
seven year jail sentence. Additionally, the current Brazilian President, Temer has 
been charged with bribery. (Phillips, 2017). 
 
These conflicting messages have collectively created a perception that the fight 
against money laundering is a sham and not genuine. To be effective, those 
charged with the implementation of the AML must set the proper tone. In this 
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instance, the chief proper tone setter in the implementation of laws is the 
President of the country followed by the heads of various ministries, agencies and 
departments charged with prosecution and enforcement of relevant laws. They 
must dismiss any action that contradicts setting a proper tone. The President and 
governmental action must not leave any room for any other interpretation except 
an unequivocal commitment to combating money laundering. 
 
B. Selective Prosecution 
 
There is a growing perception that Nigeria’s current graft war is selective and 
targeted against real and perceived opposition. Each administration (the current 
one included) has used the crime - fighting agency, EFCC as a convenient tool to 
exact reprisals on the opposition. 
 
Once President Buhari was elected, some prominent PEPs who were caught up in 
a huge money laundering scheme involving the diversion of over $2 billion meant 
to purchase arms to fight insurgency - decamped from the previous ruling party 
that lost and joined the Presidents ruling party. That was in 2015 and in May 2018 
none of those PEPs who decamped to the President’s party has been charged with 
any crime. While several former PEPs of the former party including governors 
and party functionaries have been formally charged and are currently on trial.     
 
The fact is that EFCC is still perceived to be corrupt. As of 2014, 1500 cases of 
money laundering remained unresolved. (Enejo, et al, 2014). Most of these cases 
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have been ongoing for over 10 years. Worst of all, these accused PEPs have 
continued to publicly dominate the political environment. Some have become 
Ministers after serving as Governors. Some are current serving Senators and 
others hold one prominent position or another in society. 
 
Most of – if not all – of these pending cases involve billions of dollars 
cumulatively. Some publicly alleged cases of money laundering in 2005 have not 
been responded to, nor has the public been informed of developments regarding 
them. In other words, the crime agency is selectively responsive to the public that 
pays its bills. “That is why the EFCC has been accused of political selectivity in 
its operations.” (HRW, 2011).  
 
C. The Immunity Clause 
The immunity clause in the Nigerian constitution (Section 308(1) and (2) of the 
1999 constitution provides the President, Vice President, Governors and Deputy 
Governors immunity from prosecution while in office. And Governors are one of 
the most corrupt PEPs in Nigeria. What this means is that if a governor starts to 
steal state funds from day one nothing can be done to stop him until the end of 
either four or eight years after which recovering all of the stolen funds becomes 
very difficult.  
 
One of the former Governors incorporated a shell company in the British Virgin 
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Island, which he subsequently used to launder money barely 4 months after he 
was elected. (Mayah, 216). 
 
Former Governor Ibori stole over $250 million dollars over 8 years. If the 
immunity clause did not protect Ibori from prosecution, the Nigerian relevant 
authorities would have at least had an opportunity to prosecute Ibori earlier and 
prevented the looting of further funds from State coffers.  
 
In the current Nigerian political dispensation, it appears the immunity clause has 
served more as a cover for Governors to loot funds during their term in office.  
D. International Laws  
The need to respect and comply with international laws constrains the 
effectiveness of combating money laundering. Money laundering involves cross 
border activities and investigating launderers requires seeking the permission and 
following the procedures of respective jurisdictions where money is laundered. 
(Shehu, 2006). 
 
Investigations of money laundering in the US will have to comply with the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and part of the USA Patriot Act, both of 
which deal with corruption. And investigations of money laundering in the UK 
will have to comply with regulations under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, which have extraterritorial provisions on corruption.  
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The process of complying with various international laws slows the speedily 
pursuit of stolen funds which sometimes needs to be gotten to quickly to be 
recovered. Nigeria’s former dictator, Abacha’s stolen funds is still being 
recovered 20 years after the fact because of the need to comply with the Laws of 
the US and Swiss governments. The Swiss government reached an agreement in 
late 2017 with the Nigerian government and the World Bank to return $321 
million recovered from the Abacha family. Meanwhile the Nigerian government 
was still involved in a lengthy legal process in the US to recover $480 million 
seized from the Abacha family as of December 2017.  (Monks, 2017). 
 
E. Lack of Motivation and Sufficient Benefit 
 
It is believed that well paid employees with sufficient benefits are more motivated 
in their jobs. Employees of the Nigerian crime agency, EFCC, lack sufficient 
benefits and appear to be less motivated. It is also believed that they are 
susceptible to corruption as a result. 
 
As of 2014, EFCC field operatives lacked insurance. In 2012, three EFCC 
operatives lost their lifes while attempting to apprehend corrupt officials. (Zero 
Tolerance, 2014, Akume, Okoli, 2016). This meant that these EFCC’s officers 
who died in the line of duty got nothing by way of insurance benefit (Zero 
Tolerance, 2014), (Akume, Okoli, 2016).” 
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Contrast this with the benefit structure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), a similar crime-fighting agency in the US. An FBI operative, has three 
different insurance coverages, namely, special agent life insurance program for 
$30,000, the Charles S. Ross fund at $15,750 and the comprehensive public safety 
officers benefit at $283,385, all premium-free (Zero Tolerance, 2014, Akume, 
Okoli, 2016).”  
 
“Additionally, if an FBI agent dies in the line of duty, his family gets $329,135 
(three hundred and twenty-nine thousand one hundred and thirty-five dollars). 
(Zero Tolerance, 2014), (Akume, Okoli, 2016).” 
F. Judicial Corruption 
 
The judiciary has played a very ignoble role in frustrating the fight against money 
laundering. In Ibori’s case, a Judge dismissed all charges against him despite the 
available overwhelming evidence. Ibori subsequently pled guilty to the same 
charges in London and was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment. The corruption 
of the Judge was a possible significant factor. 
 
Another Judge, Abubakar Talba, sentenced a director in a Police Pension office to 
two years with an option of a fine of two hundred and fifty thousand naira ($690 
only) without any restitution for stealing 2.5 billion naira ($649,1713 million) 
(International center for investigative reporting, 2013). This Judgment meant that 
a convicted thief gets to keep millions of dollars and walks away a free man.  
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Daily, judges, collude with lawyers by every means to pervert the course of 
justice. Recently, judges and lawyers have begun to be charged for bribery and 
money laundering. (Vanguard, 2017).    
 
One steady tool employed by lawyers and approved by judges is the use of 
interlocutory injunctions. This is an abuse of procedural law where the court 
pends a case for long periods of time without hearing the merits of the case 
frustrating the EFCC’s efforts in prosecuting cases and effectively fighting 
corruption. (Akume, Okoli, 2016). 
 
Other serious challenges include collusion of lawyers to stall and prevent quick 
dispensation of justice. 
G. Lack of Sufficient Funding 
 
The EFCC continues to suffer from insufficient funds to fulfill its mandates. 
Corrupt PEPs run the system and are charged with appropriating funds for the 
government. It is believed that the EFCC is deliberately starved of funds to 
prevent the investigation of PEPs. EFCC has lost many cases for poor case 
presentation due to inadequate funding that would have enabled adequate 
preparation. 
 
Investigations, evidence gathering and prosecuting cases are expensive because 
they require expensive and investigative tools and cross border travels. 
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Two Judges (Justices Ayoola and Mustapha Akanbi) have previously accused the 
Executive and Judicial branches of government of frustrating EFCC’s efforts by 
deliberately underfunding. (Eme, Okoh, 2011), (Mustapha Akanbi, 2014), 
(Akume, Okoli, 2016). 
 
H. Conflicting Investigative and Prosecutorial Powers 
 
Conflicting investigative and prosecutorial powers have sometimes presented the 
opportunity for abuse in an otherwise corrupt environment. It has also heightened 
distrust among the various agencies about each other’s intentions and motives. 
(Akume, Okoli, 2016). 
 
The EFCC, ICPC, Police and the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF), have 
assigned powers of investigation and prosecution of corruption cases that conflicts 
with each other without clear delimitation of the boundaries of the institutions 
involved. Section 174 of the 1999 constitution confers on the AGF the power to 
institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court 
of law in Nigeria, to take-over and continue as well as discontinue at any stage 
before judgment. The other institutions above have the same powers as well.  
(Sampson, 2009, p. 91),  (Akume, Okoli, 2016).  
 
A former AGF was noted for constant misuse of these conflicting powers by 
interruptions of ongoing EFCC trials by filing to discontinue trials against PEPs. 
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(Eme and Okoh, 2011). In fact, the same AGF’s interference led to the dismissal 
of some cases against PEPs. (HRW, 2011, p. 28).   
 
These kinds of interference from the AGF have created EFCC’s mistrust of the 
AGF’s motives, which has persisted to date. Besides, the AGF is appointed from 
the ranks of politician PEPs who are often the subjects of these investigations. 
While the investigative and prosecuting agencies are usually professionals, the 
AGF often times has already developed a relationship with PEPs. It is believed 
that a corrupt AGF would seek to protect some PEPs by undermining the 
investigative agencies.  
 4.3 International efforts to combat Money Laundering in Nigeria 
 
The International community has made both collective and individual efforts to combat 
money laundering in Nigeria. The international community here refers to the international 
anti money laundering organizations such as the “Financial Action Task Force (FATF)”, 
“The Egmont Group”, “The Wolfsberg Group”, “the United Nations Office on Drug and 
Crimes (UNODC)” and other various “specialized agencies.” 
 
The International community’s efforts in combating money laundering in Nigeria stems 
from the fact that money laundering poses a threat to the financial stability of all 
jurisdictions. Therefore, the International community could be considered consequential 
stakeholders in the fight against money laundering. As stakeholders, these international 
organizations have required Nigeria to put certain measures in place to combat money – 
laundering, including, but not limited to enacting laws and establishing institutions. 




Usually, Nigeria’s non-compliance to some of these international organizations’ anti 
money imperatives has attracted threats of coordinated sanctions. 
 
Arguably, Nigeria’s premier money laundering agency, EFCC was set up in 2003, 
partially in response to pressure from the "Financial Action Task Force" on "Money 
Laundering", which listed "Nigeria" as non-compliant in the international community's 
efforts to combat money laundering. (FATF, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, the “Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU)” was established based on 
the various collective requirements of Recommendation 26 of the FATF, “Article 7 (1) 
(b) of the United Nation Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo 
Convention)”, “the statement of Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIU)”, and “Articles 14 and 58 of the UN Convention against Corruption.” 
(Aluko, Bagheri, 2012), (Ogbodo, Meiseigha, 2013). The NFIU is charged with 
collection and analysis of data of financial information of suspected money laundering 
activities and referral to the appropriate law enforcement, regulatory and supervisory 
agencies. 
 
The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2004 (art 6, Palermo 
Convention) requires States to implement legislation to criminalize intentional money 
laundering. The Palermo Convention also specifies that the offence include the 
laundering of the proceeds of serious crime, specifically, when it is organized and 
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transnational in nature, and when the crime involves transnational organized crime. States 
are encouraged to provide mutual legal assistance to one another to facilitate proceedings 
(art. 18). 
 
International AML mandates, requires States to implement safeguards to protect the 
integrity of their financial institutions. The UN Convention against Corruption 2004 
(Vienna Convention) instructs States to prevent money laundering through requiring the 
provision of adequate regulatory and supervisory regimes for financial institutions and 
establishing FIUs (Art 14, Vienna Convention). There are also measures to ensure that 
illicitly laundered funds are not used to finance terrorism under Article 2(1) of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999. 
Therefore, the criminalization of money laundering serves as a useful tool to prevent the 
commission of more serious crimes by intercepting its source of funding. 
 
Most recently, the Nigerian parliament passed legislation that will help international 
authorities tackle money laundering, by allowing its NFIU to operate free of state control 
and share information with other international intelligence units.  This recently passed 
legislation was in response to a threat by the Egmont Group - a body of 155 Financial 
Intelligence Units worldwide - to delist Nigeria unless its own unit gained autonomy, 
enabling it to deal with financial crimes more effectively. 
 
Had Nigeria failed to pass legislation making its NFIU independent of EFCC, financial 
transactions from Nigeria, including funds transfers would have been subject to 
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international sanctions- - meaning a refusal to process tens of thousands of payments 
involving Nigeria. (Abuh, 2018). 
 
Also, the international community seeks to ensure that financial institutions have the 
requisite to know how to combat money laundering. In that regard, the Wolfsberg Group 
was set up in 2000 to provide guidance to those in the banking sector. The Wolfsberg 
Group comprising 11 international banks has published advice on how best to tackle 
money laundering in addition to other financial crimes (Wolfsberg-principles, 2014a). 
Their guidance reiterates the importance of customer due diligence and the necessity of 
keeping this under constant review (Wolfsberg-principles, 2014b), exercising caution 
when dealing with jurisdictions with weak AML controls (Wolfsberg-principles, 2014b, 
p. 3) and carrying out appropriate checks on politically exposed persons (Wolfsberg-
principles, 2014b, p. 6). The principles set out in the Wolfsberg Group's publications also 
help to facilitate uniformity of regulatory rules and risk mitigation strategies. 
4.4 Conclusion 
From the foregoing, the responses to the menace of money laundering has been mixed 
with some successes and issues impacting anti money efforts itemized in section 4.2 of 
chapter 4 above. Recommendations to these issues are contained in Chapter 5 below. 
 
The international community understands the overwhelming risk posed by money 
laundering activities. Furthermore, the international community sees money laundering as 
the fuel that feeds terrorism, drug trafficking, child trafficking, and currency trafficking 
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among other cross border crimes.  And there is a wide consensus that limiting money 
laundering will result in a correlated reduction in other crimes as well.   
The international community’s resolve in fighting money laundering is manifested in the 
many updated procedures and guidelines churned out regularly that countries are required 
to establish and implement.  Additionally, there are constant seminars, presentations and 
meetings where the latest technology among other tools are shared and highlighted by the 
various AML organizations. Perhaps, without the international community’s aggressive 
efforts these past years in limiting criminals access to illicit- funds, money laundering 
may have been worse than it is today. 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
Money laundering by PEPs has fueled other forms of corruption and has arguably 
become a way of life. (Onyeoziri, 2004).  Both the World Bank (2006) and Transparency 
International (2013) define corruption respectively as “the abuse of public power for 
private gain” and  “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain.”  
 
Corruption now pervades the Nigeria space. (Osoba, 1996). There is corruption in all 
structures of government (local, state and federal) and nothing gets done without a 
corrupt activity. In fact, Nigerians believe that the most corrupt State in the world is 
Nigeria. (Lawal, Oladunjoye, 2010).  In addition, the wider perception is that Nigeria is 
one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Shehu, 2004, pp. 69-87; Okogbule, 2006). 
Money laundering by PEPs has drained the resources that would have been used to build 
roads, provide power, build schools and hospitals, build water schemes, provide adequate 
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transportation systems propel industrialization and ensure a good life for the people 
(Iyare, 2008). The resultant effect of money laundering is that majority of Nigerians live 
in poverty and deprivation (Heinecke, 1986, p. 96). 
 
Nigeria’s reputation is in tatters and foreign investors are potentially scared away. It is 
believed that a nations association with money laundering tarnishes its image and 
financial institutions. 
 
Money laundering erodes confidence in a country’s economy because it creates 
instability. Investors want stability and would not invest in an artificial economy where 
money laundering and other crimes prevail. (McDowell, Novis, 2001).  
 
On the foregoing evidence, unchecked money laundering has fueled other sorts of 
corruption, caused financial, economic, social and political instability. Civil unrest, ethnic 
tensions, religious intolerance, entrenched resentment, sporadic kidnappings and 
bombings have become answers and outcomes of money laundering. Money laundering 




These recommendations have taken into consideration, Nigeria’s unique set of 
circumstances as a country where corruption has taken root as a way of life and is on the 
verge of destroying the basis of its existence.  
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The Nigerian people must now consider all options as a way of dealing with corruption. 
In that context, it is time to consider the death penalty as an adequate punishment for 
money laundering. In China and Vietnam, PEPs could be sentenced to death for public 
corruption (Biao, 2011; Adeniji, 2012 and Keck, 2014).  
 
Under the Chinese criminal code anyone who embezzles more than 100,000 Yuan 
($16,000) can be sentenced to death if the court decides the offence to be serious  (Ji, 
2013). In 2007, China's former drug and food safety watchdog boss was executed after 
being found guilty of accepting bribes worth 6.5 million yuan ($850,000) from eight 
companies to approve an antibiotic blamed for at least 10 deaths and other substandard 
medicines (ChinaDaily, 2007). The death penalty is China’s option of eradicating 
corruption.  
 
In Vietnam, embezzlement of state property worth 500 million dong (around $24,000 or 
18,000 Euros) faces 20 years' to life imprisonment or the death penalty (Adeniji, 2012). 
The Nigerian people have the constitutional right to consider all options to establish a 
structure that eradicates graft and enables good governance.   
 
Some of the recommendations will require constitutional amendments from Nigeria’s 
elected National Assembly. Amending the Nation’s constitution in that instance would be 
considered sacrificial since members of the National Assembly are PEPs and perceptibly 
one of the most corrupt groups of money launderers. Other recommendations will require 
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enacting law. There are recommendations requiring more action from the international 
community and organizations as well as from specific countries. 
 
Recommendations to deal with issues impacting anti-money laundering efforts in 
section 4.2 
A. Conflicting Messages 
To be effective, those charged with the implementation of the AML must set the proper 
tone. In this instance, the chief proper tone setter in the implementation of laws is the 
President of the country followed by the heads of various ministries, agencies and 
departments charged with prosecution and enforcement of relevant laws. They must 
dismiss any action that contradicts setting a proper tone. The President and governmental 
action must not leave any room for any other interpretation except an unequivocal 
commitment to combating money laundering. 
 
B. Selective Prosecution 
There is a perception that the government selectively prosecutes to protect political 
supporters. To deal with the issue of selective prosecution, the constitution could be 
amended to make provision for the President of Nigeria and Governors to serve only an 
agreed term of no more than 6 years.  This possibly has many benefits. It will enable a 
focus on governance and creates an opportunity for decisions to be devoid of political 
consideration. And there will probably be less pressure on the President and Governors to 
be obligated to pay back any favors that aided their election. 
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C. The Immunity Clause 
Abolish the immunity clause that currently protects some officials including Governors 
from arrest and prosecution until after the completion of their tenures. 
D. International Laws 
Mutual Legal assistance (MLA) agreements and treaties between Nigeria and all suspect 
destination countries of stolen funds will expedite the speedy recovery of those funds. 
MLA agreements usually serve to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement 
authorities of both countries in the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crime 
through co-operation in criminal matters.  The UK expeditiously assists Nigeria in 
recovering stolen funds as well as prosecutes suspects under this agreement. (Critique 
Nigeria, 2018). Recently, Nigeria signed a MLA with the United Arab Emirate. (Mail and 
Guardian, 2018). 
E. Lack of Motivation and Sufficient Benefit 
AML organizations must demand proper compensation for money laundering 
investigators along the lines of the developed countries like the US, Hong Kong, etc.  
F. Judicial Corruption 
Enact legislation that prescribes mandatory minimum sentences of at least 14 years for 
Judges, Law enforcement, Intelligence agents, Prosecutors and Lawyers that are 
complicit in perverting justice-involving PEPs. A zero tolerance policy is one that shocks 
the conscience. Where a conflict ensues on whether a Judge should be regarded as PEP or 
Judge for purposes of punishment, conflict will be resolved in favor of the description 
that prescribes a harsher punishment. 
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G. Lack of Sufficient Funding 
Have International AML organizations (including the UN and European backed 
organizations) require statutory regulation from Nigeria that guarantee’s funding for 
AML agencies like the EFCC, ICPC and NFIU - at a minimum threshold of an agreed 
international standard. This will ensure development capacities in all areas needed to deal 
with money laundering. Note that PEPs seek to incapacitate AML agencies by depriving 
them of sufficient funding. Failure to comply will attract international sanctions. 
Threatened financial sanctions against Nigeria have attracted compliance on a number of 
occasions.   
H. Conflicting Investigative and Prosecutorial Powers 
International AML organization should require a streamlined, less regulatory 
coordination among law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and other enforcement 
authorities that resolves duplication of responsibilities and possible areas of conflict in 
the context of a holistic global strategy to deal with money laundering. PEPs and the 
whole corrupt governmental structure seek various avenues to undermine robust AML 





1. Create and fund Specialized Economic and Financial Crime Courts. It will 
cultivate specialization and speed up the process of prosecutions. 
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2. Create a statutory constitutional amendment that requires harsher punishment for 
money laundering PEPs. Sentences should start at a minimum of at least 7 years 
on each count. 
3. Enact legislation that penalizes banks and its employee’s responsible for 
violations of reporting AML requirements and enact at a minimum jail of at least 
3 years for the lowest amount involved.   
 
4. Consult and engage private stakeholders regularly when reviewing government 
strategies. 
5. The United States can use its strength as the largest provider of aid to Nigeria and 
demand some concrete reforms and transparent enforcement of anti money 
laundering laws on the books. The US, through the United States Aid for 
International Development (USAID) provided over $500 million in aid to Nigeria 
in 2016. (USAID, 2018).  
 
Perhaps and most importantly, it is now easy for the US through the application of the 
US Global Magnitsky Act to freeze assets of Nigerian PEPs and their families in the 
US as well as ban them and their families from visiting, receiving education and/ or 
medical treatment.  
 
“The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act” authorizes the US 
President to revoke visas of certain foreign persons or to impose property sanctions 
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on them if they are government officials or acted as agents for government officials or 
senior associates of government official complicit in acts of significant corruption.  
 
Assets of Nigerian PEPs and their families can be frozen and they can be banned 
from entering the US upon recommendations from the Secretary of State to the 
President. Additionally, the US Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs; Foreign Relations and the US House’s Committees on Financial Services and 
Foreign Affairs can also submit names to the President. (Hrw.org, 2017).  
-Have International AML organizations coordinate with the most powerful financial 
and economic countries to come up with a mechanism with a view to stopping or at 
least limiting all financial outflows from Nigeria going to OFC’s mostly through the 
US or European countries. This will put pressure on PEPs and discourage Nigerian 
banks from aiding money laundering 
-The UK, Germany, France, Canada, and other prominent destinations of Nigerian 
PEPs should ban prominent suspicious PEPs and their families from visiting or 
seeking education and medical treatment in their countries by denying them visas, as 
well as freeze their assets laundered in their respective countries. 
 
These recommendations are by no mean exhaustive and if implemented will not stop 
money laundering entirely but it will certainly begin to deter, reduce and certainly be a 
starting point to combating money laundering.    
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